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DAVID J. ALLEE*

Subnational Governance
and the International Joint
Commission: Local Management
of United States and Canadian
Boundary Waters
The Canada-United States boundary is responsible for some
important differences in relationships between the people that live in the
watersheds that cross it. A host of factors are involved in changes of those
relationships. Some are reflected in the evolution of the institutions that
have been created to manage those waters and that boundary. In particular, for this assignment on the overall management of natural resources,
the International Joint Commission (IJC) and the subnational governments that come in many types and sizes are the institutions of greatest
importance.
The trend has been toward broadening the attention of the IJC
almost as fast as environmental and natural resource issues have been
addressed nationally and have thus been recognized as perhaps needing
the attention of an international boundary agency. The result has been a
more fluid sense of border, widening out to reflect the nature of the problems being addressed. To manage disputes over water levels and diversions less than a watershed view could be made to serve. But a watershed
is a good first cut for the geographic definition of a major ecosystem. Obviously, for acid rain any watershed may be too small. Policy debaters are
rarely content today to leave out the larger social and economic contextthe ecosystem then includes the whole culture. Thus, what is the border?
The role of the IJC has been that of a kind of residual claimant on
the issues, a place for the federal governments to turn after a conflict has
been reduced to a technical issue or where the IJC's study role can serve as
a step toward achieving that political result. Both governments are distracted by other concerns when dealing with environmental issues, not
the least by rapid changes in the relationships between national and subnational governments. New interests have emerged as both nations have
better understood the causes and alternatives for pollution and toxic
waste management, flooding and land use controls, drought and conser*David Allee is Professor of Resource Economics at Cornell University.
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vation, sport fishing and habitat restoration. These interests seek more
effective expression in public policy and programs nationally, subnationally and, since the border is there, internationally as well. Can the IJC
develop broader powers and a wider political role? How do potential relationships with subnational governance processes fit into the prospect of a
wider ecosystem management role?
Border states and provinces and other governance entities and
their constituents have become more active in resource and environmental
issues and have tried to influence the actions of their respective federal
governments. The federal governments and those who lobby them have
also seen the IJC as a way to influence their member governments and
their local government cohorts, but this may be less obvious. The IJC has
not always been able to live up to these expectations. More often than not,
new international relationships and patterns of interaction have emerged
outside the framework of the Commission in response to boundary definitions and issues that the IJC has not as yet been able to fully address. This
paper will explore this fluidity of an international border drawing upon
issues such as diversions, responses to lake level changes, toxic waste disposal, and groundwater protection.
The states, provinces, local governments, and concerned nongovernmental organizations, in what has been called para-diplomacy, may
evolve into a significant client group for the IJC, providing the political
support to reinvigorate the expansion of its role. The 1JC has the potential
to be similar in character to the more active river basin commissions, such
as for the Delaware, Colorado, or the Tennessee rivers. Evaluation of such
prospects should be done with a realistic notion of the potential for such
institutions in decentralized democratic federations with relatively strong
commitments to free market ideology. In particular, policy fads and foci of
the larger border partner tend to limit the progress of border institutional
evolution.
A part of this realism should be an understanding of the competition for attention and support from other outlets for public entrepreneurship. These other outlets would range from the other boundary related
organizations, such as the Great Lakes Commission or the Great Lakes
Fisheries Commission, to the totally active federal agencies, such as the
United States Army Corps of Engineers or Environment Canada, not to
mention bilateral cooperation at the state and provincial level, and the
local government level.
To fill this tall order this paper will suggest tentative generalizations about some roles subnational governments have played, how they
have been involved in Commission decisions, blocked or facilitated them,
enjoyed access, been frustrated in meeting local objectives, and were able
to use the process to complement other relations with their federal governments.
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Initially, the difference in United States state/federal and Canadian provincial/federal relationships will be explored. There is some evidence to suggest that these differences, largely cultural and constitutional,
are narrowing and may not be as important as sometimes is assumed. For
example, these constitutional issues may be less significant than for the
issues important to the region to be supported by the United States Congress, where lack of response may do far more to block progress.
Then the character of local governance will be explored, including
some of the differences between each nation. It will be argued that for
many of the environmental and natural resource issues facing boundary
waters, the development of improved governance and management
capacity at the local level may be a key to future progress. Alternatives for
the evolution of the IJC will be addressed by including this local capacitybuilding aspect. Providing the extra energy needed to achieve intergovernmental cooperation at the local levels plus a means to inform local
leadership of the elements of these issues should be the target.

FEDERALISM
In constitutional terms, the federal governments are in different
positions relative to their subnational governments in their authority to
manage natural resources. In political terms, the differences are not as
great and may be diminishing. In the division of powers, the Canadian
federal government must recognize the primacy of the provinces-it's
their water. Environment Canada does not set standards for water
quality-that is a provincial function. Under the terms of the 1972 and
1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements and related documents, the
Canadian national government must look to Ontario and the other provinces to directly implement the terms of the Agreement.
Structured provincial/national negotiations and resulting agreements are an instrument for such coordination in addition to special legislative authorities. With the careful guidance of the superbureaucrats
(Treasury Board, Prime Minister's Office, etc.), but with growing initiative
and control from their provincial counterparts, the intergovernmental
consultation process is carried on with respect to every phase of Canadian
governance. For water issues, this would seem to be something like,combining the old United States Water Resources Council with the National
Governors' Association. In 1975 there were almost 800 of these federal/
provincial meetings; over 150 that could have dealt with some aspect of
boundary water problems.' Under the Canadian Water Act of 1985, such
federal/provincial agreements are to be negotiated where there is signifi1. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Studies in Comparative
Federalism (1981).
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cant national interest. Presumably the negotiation of an agreement with
the United States enhances the argument for what is of national interest,
but up to a few years ago no agreements had been negotiated under this
authority.2 However, to carry out the provisions of the Water Quality
Agreement, the Province of Ontario and the Canadian federal government
do have an agreement that establishes compatible commitments and
responsibilities apparently under other authority.
More to the point for the future may perhaps be the movement
toward reform reflected in the Canadian Water Policy Statement of 1987,3
which was stimulated by the Pearse Inquiry into Federal Water Policy.
This reform is to press for "realistic" pricing of water services, scientific
leadership, policy integration between levels of government and agencies,
to reform laws, and change public attitudes. This suggests more activism
on the part of the federal government than the constitutional restrictions
would imply. Perhaps the aggressive stance of the 1970s for a stronger
water quality role, successfully resisted by the provinces, will return with
a water quantity focus. 4

The United States Constitution as interpreted by the courts gives
more apparent authority to its federal government. The United States
Environmental Protection Agency can set standards, reclaim delegated
enforcement power, and be assigned a variety of direct roles. But, in fact,
most of its programming is channeled through the states. Negotiations
with the states to achieve any treaty obligations are very much a part of
the game and could be included in the negotiated annual agreements over
funding and programs under the various Congressional policy mandates.
Unlike some other federal agencies, including other water management
agencies, EPA does not maintain state or local offices. When such offices
are clearly needed, an alternative to programming through the states has
been to share programming with agencies that do have them, such as the
Corps of Engineers (wetland protection) or the Soil Conservation Service
(nonpoint sources). In previous attempts to provide more comprehensive
river basin integration between agencies water quality has usually stood
apart from the water quantity oriented planning and development activities.
On the quantity side, water rights and water law have always
been primarily a state responsibility. Federal water development projects
2. A. Roman & D.Ferris, Regulation of GroundwaterContaminationin Canada,65 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 424 (1989).
3. L. Shabman, ComparingCanadianand United States Water Policyfor EconomicDevelopmentt
in Agricultural and Rural Restructuring: Comparisons of the United States, Canada, and
Europe (1990); T. McMillan, Water Resource Planning in Canada, 45 J. Soil & Water Conservation 614 (1990).
4. D.LeMarquand, Preconditionsto Cooperationin Canada-UnitedStates Boundary Waters, 26
Nat. Res. J.230 (1986).
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have always been an extension of local political support into the Congress,
usually frustrating executive branch attempts to apply control. The
always considerable ability of the states to veto or to lobby for particular
projects has been increasing, ironically just as the Congressional delegations have found many other ways of meeting constituent needs, thus
reducing interest in water development projects. Expanding state staffs
have allowed this influence to grow at the federal agency planning level,
and river basin commissions, usually dominated by these state staffs, can
be an extension of this process. Environmental concerns have increased
conflict (e.g., no omnibus bills from 1974 to 1986), reshaped the agenda
(e.g., cost sharing rose, habitat restoration legitimized), and added possibilities for more comprehensive coordination between quantity and quality management.
There is an increasing realization that achieving many federal
objectives in resource management is linked to influencing local land use
decisions. A current example is groundwater protection, but the history of
erosion control illustrates the same idea. The greater freedom of action by
the states in that policy realm-a function of their relationship to local
governments -makes state/federal partnership approaches even more
germane.
Perhaps more to the point are some other differences on the two
sides of the border. In the United States, interests that are to be accommodated in a policy reform are expected to be represented, particularly to the
Congress, by organizations outside of the formal governmental structure.
These groups may have long-standing client relationships with particular
agencies and have been far more influential than their counterparts in
Canada, although this is changing. Professionals within the Canadian civil
service are expected to represent the interests to be taken into account, but
they are being more effectively lobbied than in the past. 5 Shabman
attributes the difference to the way in which the Canadian courts have
limited standing in resource issues to those directly involved, to a civil service tradition that limits politicization to only the highest levels, and to a
greater cultural acceptance of the legitimacy and authority of formal government institutions. To a greater extent in Canada, power is conferred by
rather than an expectation of
an attitude of "that is the way it works"
6
interest group politics and pluralism.
The systems are of different sizes and the relationships between
federal partners are changing in different ways at the same time. While
United States policy has seen a federal devolution to the states under the
guise of deficit pressures, the Canadian relationships have gone through
restructuring as a result of the difference between the energy rich prov5. ACIR, supra note 1, at 34.
6. Shabman, supranote 3, at 3.
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inces and the rest. Always a country of strong regional interests and thus
regional parties, the ability of the Liberal Party of Trudeau to attract support west of Ontario dried up over oil pricing policies that left western
producers facing half the world price while revenue sharing formulae
were changed to their disadvantage to reflect increases in oil and gas revenue. These equalization formulae are a major factor in provincial finance
and have led to what the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) called in 1981 "... .remarkably small differences in public services." 7 These payments have increased faster than the overall GNP in
recent years. This system, plus funding of health services and postsecondary education, seems to reflect the results of more dependence on the type
of rationality experts and professional bureaucrats can apply to a problem
when given more scope. It is not clear that similar differences in traditions
infuse the water policy arena in the two countries.
Some other realities of political power further set the stage for the
relationships of the subnational governments to the management of the
border. Any one issue along the border is of less salience in Washington
than in Ottawa. On the other hand, it may be of greater salience in Minneapolis/St. Paul or Madison than in Toronto. LeMarquand makes the point
that, from the Canadian point of view, the western rivers flowing into the
United States are potential sites for economic development, the border a
corridor for development. 8 From the United States side, the rivers are seen
as wilderness areas, the last remaining accessible frontier.
On the Great Lakes the positions differ, but with similar results.
The United States makes the lion's share of the use of the waters and has
over two-thirds of the Basin population, with a corresponding share of the
toxic releases and nonpoint pollution. But while the basin has a third of
the Canadian population, it has only one-seventh of the United States voters (and more to the point, only a similar share of the lobbyists), but on
water issues it has less a tradition of unified action than most other parts
of the nation. In many relevant issues the region is politically disadvantaged (part of the rust belt) to other parts of the country (the sun belt). For
example, the shift away from federal funding for pollution control has
made worse a situation that already disadvantaged the areas whose sewers were long ago built to the wrong specifications. Costs to achieve
increased removal of a pound of oxygen demand have always been higher
in the older cities, as much as four times higher than a few years ago.
In the last few years, a regional voice on environmental matters
has been developing for the Great Lakes. The Council of Great Lakes Governors with the support of Ontario and Quebec adopted the Great Lakes
Charter in 1985. Spurred on by rumors of covetous interest in their water
7. ACIR, supra note 1, at 42.
8. LeMarquand, supra note 4, at 225.
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by arid regions of the country, they have agreed to keep each other
informed about water withdrawals (1988). They also agreed to take concerted action on toxics (1986) and added a $100 million endowment for
protection efforts (1988). 9 The linkages with Ontario and Quebec on diversions and acid rain have been direct and vigorous if informal.
Nonetheless, LeMarquand concludes
Canada is dependent on American domestic politics to
solve issues of reciprocal damage. Where American
groups allied to Canadian interests lack political force
in Washington, as they do for issues like acid rain, the
Canadian government can do little.., international
agreements will 10only be as progressive as domestic
American policy.
It is a little hard to judge just how this is working out. Certainly
many wish progress were faster on many issues of regional concerntoxic discharges and remediation, nutrient enrichment of the lakes, air
deposition of pollutants, and in the long run, the consumptive use of
water. But how does the impact on Canadians of a lagging rate of change
on these issues in the United States compare to the effect of Canada's own
rate of policy development and institutional capacity? Perhaps Canadian
attitudes toward the legitimacy of government allows their approach to
water quality management and stream standards to work better than
when it was relied upon in the United States. Perhaps greater official sensitivity to outside interest groups and their greater bargaining power in
the United States made it necessary in 1972 for the United States to move
away from control by objectives based on overall ambient standards
toward discharge standards based on available technology.1 ' But these
differences allow Canadians Roman and Ferris to conclude
The United States regulatory regimes, although somewhat imperfect, are far ahead of the situation in Canada. Ontario, one of Canada's most advanced
provinces from the standpoint of environmental protection, has a long way to go to catch up to the standard of regulation of groundwater enjoyed in the
United States... most other provinces are not even up
to the Ontario standards.1 2

9. G. Francis, Binational Cooperationfor Great Lakes Water Quality:A Frameworkfor the
GroundwaterConnection, 65 Chic.-Kent L. Rev. 369 (1989).
10. LeMarquand, supra note 4, at 227-28.
11. J.Carroll, Water Resources Management As an Issue in Environmental Diplomacy, 26 Nat.
Res. J.217 (1986).
12. Roman & Ferris, supra note 2, at 551.
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Perhaps the Canadian federal government has or will find the IJC
a useful instrument to prod its provinces.
In any case when the Boundary Waters Treaty can be invoked it
applies the principle of equal and similar rights for each side. Equal use of
the assimilative capacity and thus a reduction of the United States use has
been harder to achieve than equal use for power production. Also under
the Treaty, equal access to each other's courts is maintained. This, plus the
interlocking language, dominant culture, and pervasive organizational
and commercial linkages, gives hope to the notion that participatory
access could and should be increased. 13 Practice by a growing number of
environmental and other organizations and vigorous lobbying on occasion by Canadian federal and provincial
governments in the United States
4
capitals has set the precedent.
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE IJC
From the above, it should come as no surprise that subnational
governments play important roles in the functions of the IJC. Boards for
lake level control and for water or air quality surveillance are routinely
composed of a mixture of federal and subnational government professional staff. In a small, informal sampling of annual reports, of 35 cases
where individual affiliations were listed, 19 were with federal agencies
and 16 were with subnational governments, even a few municipalities.
This balancing reflects the logic of the tasks-subnational governments
on both sides of the border share the locus of the expertise and responsibility and to a large extent effectively represent the social interests that
must be balanced. In the great majority of the cases, the role of the boards
is to give technical expertise to an issue whose value aspects are stable and
have been settled to the point that they can be delegated to such groups to
be bargained out on a technical level.
It would be a mistake to infer that these boards are not under
stress from shifting social expectations, or that they do not come under
attack by dissidents. The point is that they probably are not much different
in that regard than the agencies whose hats the members wear when they
are not on duty with the board. The boards are extensions across the border of their domestic duties.
In the individual references, such as that for lake level control in
1986 and the 1977 reference on Great Lakes diversions and consumptive
uses, the logic of the task may suggest different makeup of the groups
assigned. The project management teams may reflect the fact that the
issues are not stabilized politically and that values need to be addressed
13. A. Scott, The Canadian-AmericanProblem of Acid Rain, 26 Nat. Res. J. 344 (1986).
14. LeMarquand, supra note 4, at 222.

Winter 1993]

SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE IJC

and conflicts resolved. With the growth of state and provincial capability
to address policy development in the water realm, a shift has taken place
in the likely role of subnational governments in such deliberations.
Note that in January 1985, the reports on Great Lakes diversions
Were issued, one by the IJC to the national governments, 15 and one by a
task force to the governors and premiers of the states and provinces.16 The
similar timing was not accidental. The significant action that came out of
these intertwined deliberations was taken by the governors and premiers,
who agreed to collect and share data on consumptive use. This put the
information closest to the governments that would have the most to do
with preventing unreasonable use and diversions even if the instrument
for such a conflict were the proposed project of an agency of one of the
national governments. Water supply politics in both countries today is
more the concern of subnational than national governments. Given that
there were no legitimate proposals to actually take Great Lakes water out
of the basin, their action was probably more effective in warning others to
look elsewhere than anything the national governments could have done.
Nonetheless, the 1985 Governors Task Force took the opportunity
to make some points about national responsiveness to their region's concerns. Like the 1989 GAO report, they point out that there is no system to
17
track responsibility for implementing or rejecting IJC recommendations.
In addition to greater federal responsiveness to IJC recommendations they
want rules of procedure changes and authority to allow the IJC to initiate
studies. The combination would give the region a stronger voice in
national water affairs. But the strongest language was largely directed not
toward diversion issues but toward water quality, and clarifying the need
for a vigorous and collective role for the states to the United States federal
government in the renegotiation of the Water Quality Agreement in 1986.
Similar expressions of discontent were surely being made in the annual
negotiations for water quality program agreements between each state
and the United States EPA. This was a time when the Reagan Administration had orchestrated a drastic retrenchment of United States EPA, including some amazing misreading of the public support for environmental
protection. Environmental groups had seen major growth in membership
as a result of the public reaction. Indeed, the IJC had its role cut back in the
Carter Administration and then, at the advent of the Reagan period, it languished without full appointments until 1982 and had been largely
ignored by both governments up to the 1985 report.
15. Int'l Joint Comm'n, Great Lakes Diversions and Consumptive Uses: A Report to the
Governments of the United States and Canada Under the 1977 Reference (1985).
16. Great Lakes Governors Task Force, Water Diversions and Great Lakes Institutions
(1985).
17. General Accounting Office, Need to Reassess U.S. Participation in the International
Joint Commission (1989).
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The history of the 1986 lake levels reference makes the same point:
the subnational governments did not wish to be left out When the issues
primarily concerned them. The study team for the initial reports was led
and largely staffed by federal agencies, especially the United States Army
Corps of Engineers (IJC Project Management Team). This made sense as
there was still a hope by some of the concerned parties, who had pressed
for the relief, that structural measures such as dams, channels, and dikes
might be found feasible even though they had not been in previous
responses to high water problems. They did not get that result, but at least
they had a study done by the professionals most likely to find such measures feasible. Now it was time to respond to those who saw the alternatives differently.
The progress report may or may not have put the case for structural measures to rest, but it did rekindle the policy fires' under nonstructural alternatives: if you can't keep the water off the people, maybe you
can move the people away from the water. At the very least, you can establish an authoritative source of information about the system, its management, and the options local people have to solve their problems due to
water level changes. Nonstructural measures of this kind are most likely
to be implemented by subnational governments, particularly local governments, if at all. Thus, it makes sense for the study team for the second
phase to be made up of more state and provincial actors. This was the recommendation of the scoping workshop called by the IJC for the second
phase and was the eventual result. A recommendation for a system information clearinghouse probably operated by the IJC can be expected.
Another recommendation of the IJC scoping workshop was that
feasibility demonstration projects be planned and evaluated in cooperation with municipalities that face the range of typical shoreline problems
due to lake level changes. If local governments do not develop a sense of
ownership for such solutions they aren't likely to happen. Neither federal
government has had much success in developing such programs. Thus,
some experimentation and institutional innovation is needed to find political stability. Such an approach would have put the phase II study in the
business of local government capacity-building.
LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND THE IJC
Groundwater protection from toxic contamination is a further
example of a management problem that will need to be solved in a partnership approach that involves local governments as well as states, provinces, and the federal agencies.18 As a recent Chicago-Kent Law Review
18. E. Witt, The Tedious Chore of Preparingfor Chemical DisasterIs in the Lap of Local Governments, in Governing the States and Localities (1988).
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issue demonstrates, both countries are experimenting to find more effective policy and program combinations. Toxics, which in the Great Lakes
are making sportfish cleaning stations potential toxic waste clean-up sites,
are posing many difficulties. Much of this chemical loading appears in
contaminated groundwater. Can the work of the IJC under the Water
Quality Agreements facilitate the prevention task as it has helped highlight remediation? Note that the governors and premiers have again taken
some independent initiative on the topic. It bodes well for future support
for further innovations and for developing cooperation to extend equal
protection of the law across the border. But, if local governments develop
a large role in management of the risk of contamination, facilitating their
border relations also will be needed. If so, what models will work?
Facilitating local government cooperation is not a new question
for the IJC. The negotiation of a toxics control agreement between Ontario
and New York is directly relevant. The Niagara River has provided an
opportunity for cooperation at every level, as have the St. Mary's and
Detroit rivers. Contact, communication, and cooperation on everything
from oil spills to the Seaway have been a feature of the St. Lawrence River.
But future opportunities may put an even greater premium on local government participation. LeMarquand suggests that the major future issues
facing the border will be reciprocal in nature; that is, they will involve benefits and costs on both sides of the border.19 He lists nutrients, toxics, air
deposition, and consumptive use. If he is right, these are all issues in
which local governments have a major stake in either the result or the
approach to control.
Developing new capacity for local governments will be a challenge that should be made a bit easier by understanding some of the characteristics of local governments beyond the fact that they tend to dominate
the implementation of land use controls. In both countries, local governments derive their formal powers from the state/provincial governments. 20 The form thus varies greatly from state to state and province to
province. Some of the differences are striking.
In Canada, a strong local/provincial partnership approach to providing public services appears to operate, but this is city-directed, or more
to the point, urban-region-directed. 21 The role of the county as rural
administrator and regional government as found in many United States
states appears to be absent. Urban consolidation concepts have been taken
seriously. About the time Woodrow Wilson penned his classic 1895 text
about fragmentation, lines of authority, and overlapping jurisdiction,
19. LeMarquand, supra note 4, at 225.
20. T. Johnson & G. McDowell, Differences in Powerand Responsibility between Canadianand
American Local Governments: A Rural Economic Development Perspective, in Agricultural and
Rural Restructuring: Comparisons of the United States, Canada and Europe (1990).
21. Id. at 23.
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Canadian local governments were being depoliticized, reducing one set of
linkages to national parties. Regional governments are being superimposed on the clusters of urbanization by provincial legislatures as halfway
steps toward municipal integration. The roots for this go back to changes
made in the 1930s and stress infrastructure, schools, and safety services.
The intergovernmental constitutive process, such a striking feature of federal/provincial relations, is largely absent at the provincial/local level.
Canadian provinces cannot delegate as cleanly as can their United
States counterparts. They remain responsible and exercise more detailed
veto powers and supervision even in areas they have delegated. And less
has been delegated to local governments outside cities. Provinces are fond
of setting up boards and commissions instead of delegating functions to
local governments, particularly outside of cities. This includes public
health, conservation, and community planning.
In addition, local revenue bases are more restricted, cutting independence further. The property tax is highly developed. But, as in the
United States, the shift in responsibility toward local governments has not
been matched by a corresponding increase in access to revenue sources. A
tax base equalization system similar to the national system operates at the
provincial level in seven of the provinces. Over half of local revenues are
from provincial appropriations, but they appear to be allocated less in
response to conceptually driven formulae than is true at the federal level.
A significant proportion of those funds is made available with little or no
specifications on how they will be spent.
In contrast, delegation of functions by states to local governments
has been greater, and increasing, as the United States federal government
has gone through a process of devolution. The last several decades have
seen an explosion in the development of revenue sources, particularly the
use of fees. While fiscal stress is also a common feature of current local
governments, there is considerable scope locally to try to make a difference and the potential shift to more state financing and control, as happened in California or Massachusetts after their tax revolts.
In many states, United States local governments have a strong tradition of home rule, and they are accustomed to operating in an arena
with many other entities competing for the hearts and minds of their constituents. From New York to Illinois there is the potential for the citizen to
turn to at least four levels of government for redress or service: town,
county, state, or federal, with many combinations and interconnections.
Even in states that have the legal assumption that local governments can
only do those functions specifically authorized by state governments (the
Dillon Rule) there is a presumption of considerable independence as to
how those functions will be performed.
Access to the legislature at the more inclusive levels of governments, and the expectation of influence on how that body will evolve pol-

Winter 1993]

SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE IJC

icy, is expected on the part of the various types and sizes of local
governments. Counties, cities, and towns have similar representative
organizations at state and federal levels, reflecting less a "chain of command" structure. Indeed, public districts for irrigation, sewer, and flood
control, public and private water suppliers, port authorities, coastal zone
management agencies, and many other groups connected with the public
management of water resources are also likely to have their own representatives at the several capitals.
Johnson and McDowell pose some speculations that appear to
have some significance for dealing with management problems. 22 They
have, for example, a different view of rural and of community that may
need to be recognized by boundary water managers. The sense of place in
the United States, they argue, is for a territory, a county, or a valley. In Canada the sense of identity, and thus sense of responsibility, may have more
linkage to a point, a town, or city. Economic development between communities is seen as more competitive in the United States, and with more
local responsibility taken for stimulating that development compared to
the two more inclusive levels of government. Provincial governments are
more likely than states to think and act in terms of communities and subregions. Nongovernmental organizations have emerged to carry out in
rural areas many of the tasks that governments would perform in the
United States. They create incentives for individual action and facilitate
community decisionmaking, roles more often expected of local governments in the United States. Spatial flexibility in problem representation is
seen as easier to come by in Canada, and economic development easier in
the United States, as a result of these differences.
THE CASE OF GROUNDWATER PROTECTION
It would seem that these differences might show themselves in
some of the innovations needed to increase the intensity of ecosystem
management of the boundary waters of the two nations. Watershed management is an illustrative case. Groundwater quality management should
be shifting from a reactive to a proactive mode. Once contaminated it is so
expensive to reclaim that the general position is that policy evolution
should emphasize prevention. This is consistent with the multiple-barriers philosophy in public health doctrine.
Groundwater is more idiosyncratic in its behavior than surface
water, and thus its management requires more detailed knowledge of the
local landscape. Prevention also requires more attention to the type of
face-to-face management in which local public entities should have an
22. Johnson & McDowell, supra note 20 at 8.
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advantage. But, as the history of land use controls suggests, the capacity
for that kind of management varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The use of toxics that have the potential for significant damage at
very low concentrations is ubiquitous, but the mix varies greatly over the
landscape depending upon the mix of land uses. Thus, in addition to great
variability in the distribution of vulnerability of contamination over the
landscape there is great variability in the distribution of hazards and the
capacity of institutions for that management. The surface watershed is
often a good approximation of the physical unit for management. Local
governments can usually be grouped and/or subdivided into such units.
Watershed management units have been sought in both countries
for many years with some success. 23 For example, the Milwaukee River is
organized as a regional water quality utility. In Ontario, conservation
authorities on watershed lines were first formed in 1946 and now number
38. They are reported to be "completely locally driven." They are funded
by provincial project grants, taxes for capital improvements, and operating assessment against municipalities. These are held up as a model for
more United States watersheds to follow. The Ohio Conservation Districts
are the closest examples in the border states. And the IJC's program of
Areas of Concern (AOC) are seen as a mechanism for encouraging such
management entities. Are these straws in the wind?
The IJC could be asked to impact the evolution of watershed management in several ways. The setting where the border divides a watershed is somewhat different than the case where the watershed is wholly
contained in the respective country. Both could be targeted. The IJC board
mechanism is already employed to deal with air pollution, water flows,
and water quality in a number of such regions. Examples include the
Detroit and St. Clair rivers, the Souris, the Red, the Rainy, the St. Croix, the
Skagit, and many more all along the border. With the increase in the activity and capability of the states and provinces to represent their water interests, these models should be expanded in their application. A question can
be raised as to the cumbersomeness of working through foreign affairs
channels for each case separately and completely. A reference that gave
the IJC continuing authority to facilitate cooperation at a less formal level
until the basis for a formal agreement was well worked out could increase
the effectiveness of the process. Encouraging like management capability
on each side of the border could be stimulated by involving the respective
state and province in this incubation process. The nature of water conflicts
is such that the crisis needed to put a more formal organization-a separate board-in place will likely come along. The advantage will be that a
23, The Center for the Great Lakes reports that at one of its recent conferences a number of
examples were discussed. Center for the Great Lakes, Areas of Concern: Watershed Agencies
Could Hold the Key for AOCs, 7 Great Lakes Rep. 6 (1990).
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more comprehensive base for such a result will have been put in place and
thus the terms of reference for the board should more nearly match the
complexities of the problem.
In case of the watersheds more removed from the border but still
obviously a part of the larger ecosystem, a strategy more directly involving the capacity of the state or province to stimulate such changes is
needed. The AOC/RAP approach of the IJC under the Water Quality
Agreement is a model for the approach that might be taken here. This
essentially uses a process employed by the United States federal water
quality managers before their authority was expanded in 1972.24 Conferences were used to bring parties together who had not yet complied with
the objectives of the program to discuss their plans for doing so. Coercion
levels were modest, information levels and an educational impact were
more significant in the extent to which progress was made. It matched the
level of support and expectations of the publics that were concerned about
water quality.
Important to either setting would be the development of information about those examples of intergovernmental cooperation that might
improve the results in these watersheds. Thus, the IJC and the states and
provinces involved should cooperate, not only in the educational processes suggested, but also in a process that identifies these examples and
makes available those officials and community leaders that make them
work. Examples would be the use of districts to make the linkage between
voluntary programs and regulatog approaches now often seen as adversarial rather than complementary.
It is one thing to have a copy of an ordinance or an annual report
or a case study from a community like yours that has dealt with a problem
like yours. It is of even more use to have a visit or two or ten with someone
who faced the political process and the institutional constraints that you
face. United States EPA has such a "peer to peer" program in place and it
could easily be applied along the border by an IJC reference team.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The focus for water management issues in both countries is on the
provinces in Canada and the states in the United States. With the growth
of a larger federal role in Canada since the Pearse Commission and with
the shrinking of the United States federal role since the Carter presidency,
but especially under Reagan and the many stimuli to expand the always
24. Pub. L. No. 92-500 (1972).
25. J. Davidson, Commentary: Using Special Water Districts to Control Nonpoint Sources of

Water Pollution, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 503 (1989).
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important state role, the balance of the partnership on both sides has
become more alike than different. The essential role of impacting. United
States policy evolution to in turn release institutional development for
management of the boundary waters highlights the importance of local
involvement in issue development. Organized local interests, often effectively represented by local governments, at the very least offer an access
route to the congressional delegations. State agency representatives to IJC
activities have found, as they have with traditional river basin commissions, that this can be an effective means of building multi-state coalitions.
With the roles that the IJC plays, especially in developing the political side
of the fact finding process, it is in a position to give the local capacitybuilding aspects more recognition in its activities and in time to expand a
clientele that can effectively support its evolution into new roles.
Among many sources of uncertainty is the future growth of the
role of the Great Lakes Commission-a state compact group-and the
Council of Great Lakes Governors. They may compete successfully for the
same support base leaving the IJC with growth of a judicial role, while
those organizations take on more of the political representation role,
including the important task of working out accommodations with the
Canadian interests. Such a result might be more viable, if messy.
1. Expand the application of the Remedial Action Plan (RAP)
model. The citizens of the two nations, thanks to the treaty
that established the IJC, already have access to each others'
courts to obtain redress for damages inflicted on the ecosystem, such as with toxics. But, just as the litigation route has
proven to be of limited effectiveness from a national perspective, it has been even less impressive internationally. It has
been argued that political participation is also needed, and
that has included direct lobbying by Canadian agencies and
organizations. 26 The designation of AOCs and facilitation of
RAPs brings this process to the local level. The AOC/RAP
process has the potential to be an effective local capacitybuilding approach, particularly when it is linked to watershed
management as a way to encourage intergovernmental cooperation at the local level.
The AOC/RAP process can be applied to many other concerns
than toxic waste sites, the predominant use of the process to date under
the Water Quality Agreement, and with variation, it could become a standard feature of the IJC approach to references and other activities. In addition to intergovernmental cooperation as a tool to increase capacity, local
leadership development and patterns of improved local access and program support can be encouraged with or without a watershed emphasis.
26. Scott, supra note 13.
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Such an approach can be used to raise questions, such as Scott's suggestion to explore compensation, or the use of alternative dispute resolution
concepts, with or without public debate needed to reshape values and policy expectations, or pricing policies to encourage more responsible management.
Examples for an expanded AOC/RAP approach include habitat
restoration, urbanization management, rural development through water
supply protection and development, waterfront revitalization, public
wellhead protection, nonpoint pollution control, and many others. The
choice should be responsive to emerging needs identified by the states
and provinces, and targets of opportunity that bring to the attention of
legislators the opportunities for program development. In particular, the
incubation of issues should be facilitated so that more thoughtful and
comprehensive responses can be implemented when a sense of crisis
opens policy windows. 27 Indeed, policy windows may be opened by such
efforts with a lower level of crisis if they create more effective regional coalitions.
2. Facilitate more cross border state/provincial and local government interactions. There are hundreds of examples of cooperation and accommodation between adjoining governments
that have gone to the point of formal agreements at the state/
provincial level. 28 If our experience cataloging such cooperation at local municipal level in New York is any guide, there
are probably even more at the local governmental level along
the border that have not been so formalized. These are more
likely where there is the opportunity for communication to
identify common interests. The conventional wisdom of a
multiplicity of competing jurisdictions blocking the solution
of multiple jurisdictional problems is only partly right.
Boundary lines make for divisions of interest representation
and call for either extra leadership or other political resources.
But these can be supplemented by more inclusive levels of
government. Since different problems call for different geographic "federations" of local representation, greater fragmentation at the local level could become more efficient
overall than consolidation. Even watersheds come in different
scales.
Can the fact finding and judicial roles of the IJC be broadened to
include the role of creating problem-solving organizations? Again, under
the AOC/RAP concept thesis seems workable. But even in the absence of
27. D. Allee & L. Dworsky, Breaking the IncrementalistTrap: Achieving Unified Management
of the Great Lakes Ecosystem, in Symposium on International and Transboundary Water
Resources Issues (J.Fitzgibbon et al. eds., 1990).
28. A. Utton, A Book Review of J. Owen Saunders, Managing Natural Resources in a Federal
State, 3 Transboundary Res. Rep. 6 (1989).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol, 33

agreement to expand that function, it would seem that under the reference
study process it should be possible to inventory such cross boundary
cooperation and develop a typology useful to those seeking such accommodations. But future references to the IJC are needed for that route to be
followed. State/provincial and local interests working through their federal contacts should consider this as a way to generate needed studies.
Local governments in particular are accustomed to seeking out
governments like themselves that have faced a particular problem from
whom they can learn what they need to solve their own difficulty. This
"peer to peer" approach as part of the process of exploring and testing out
alternative solutions should give the reports of the IJC to their respective
governments more program development punch. Federal and state agencies who make up reference study teams should be willing to assist as it
builds prospects for their programs.
3. Create an independent IJC ecosystem review board with only
fact finding powers. Milbrath argues that one of the functions
of disputes is to provide a learning experience and that this
role can be institutionalized through a board of experts who
would review proposed actions before they were taken. Under
the Water Quality Agreement, such a board seems possible.
Under the recent trend of governments to cut back the staffing
and referrals to the IJC, it seems unlikely.
This Ecosystem Review Board would join the Water Quality
Board and the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board. Its only power would
be to cause a short delay in proposed projects of regional significance, and
then provide a new source of estimation about system wide and cross
boundary consequences of a proposed action. The IJC does this now, but
only on references of the national governments-in other words, late in
the dispute resolution process. The point would be to identify under what
conditions others (states, provinces, or municipalities, or even nongovernmental organizations) might trigger this result earlier in a likely conflict.
This role for an IJC board might serve as a way to provide more
formal access to nationals of the other country in proceedings such as
environmental impact statement reviews and the like. As Sadler has
pointed out, such an early referral of a potential border conflict to the IJC
would be consistent with the scoping process for environmental impact
statements under the United States National Environmental Policy Act
and its counterpart in Canada, the Environmental Assessment and
Review Process. 29 Subnational governments play an active role in these
national policy stimulating systems and have similar processes for actions
not covered under the national programs. It would seem that they should
be able to represent the interests of their constituents in a similar way
29. B.Sadler, The InternationalJoint Commission: Pastand Future,4 Transboundary Res. Rep.
1 (1990).
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when the border is involved in the problem. It is both inefficient and
unfair to have less.
Such a board would need a standing system for garnering expertise. The members of the board could be individuals whose positions give
them the background to review submissions. A staff able to support the
process would have to be considered and a proactive research program
would not be amiss and could complement the other IJC functions.
Adding the charge and capability to implement alternative dispute resolution techniques is a possibility.30 These efforts to find "win/
win" solutions for all sides of a conflict are attractive for situations that are
stable in terms of political value systems-the situation where most IJC
boards work well. But where no board exists, or there is one but it and its
national institutional counterparts are under regular attack by interests
not well accommodated by the policy process, then the public debate is
needed. This suggests that other boards might be equipped with alternative dispute resolution training and support staff, but it not be provided
for an IJC board whose task is to provide a more rational basis for debate.
4. An Ecosystem Review Board with subnational input and an
improved national response system. An alternative would be
to have an Ecosystem Review Board that reported only to the
national governments, as with current references. Again, the
point would be to provide different access to the triggering of
such reviews. Staff teams composed of state, provincial, and
local officials could use the occasion to work out differences
while they provided information and analysis on questions
that could be answered from available information.
As noted in a recent United States General Accounting Office
report, the national governments do not have a working system to report
out what actions are taken when the IJC makes a recommendation. The
involvement of an entity like the United States Water Resources Council
could solve that problem. That is, it could be resolved with an interagency
committee. Formal notification of congressional committees could be
helpful in any follow-up.

30. D. Sewell & A. Utton, Getting to Yes in United States-Canadian Water Disputes, 26 Nat.
Res. J. 201 (1986).

